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1.  Introduction 
The  title which  the  conference organisers have  given  to  my  paper  is 
not  particularly  transparent.
1 Adjustmen~ is an  ugly  and  loosely used  part of  the 
economist's  lexicon.  Moreover,  when  one  looks  at what  it means  in practice 
it is a  rather  uncomfortable  business. 
I  interpret adjustment  to  mean  changing  an  economy's  performance  and 
structure  in order  to  Lessen  disequilibria  such  as  in  inflation,in the  balance 
of  payments  and  in  Labour  markets,  and  to  improve  competitiveness  and 
productivity  when  this  is  falling  behind  the standards of a  relevant  peer 
group  of  countries. 
Its  European  dimensions  may  cover  on  the one  hand  those adjustment 
problems  which  are  in  some  way  special  to  Europe,  and  on  the other  hand 
techniques  of  policy action or  coordination which  may  be  organised at  the  level 
of  the  European  Community  to supply  some  remedy. 
The  central  part of  this paper  concerns  in fact  both  these aspects  in 
the  type  of  adjustments  needed  for  a  beneficial  use  of  the European  Monetary 
System.  This  concerns  price stabilisation,  balance of payments  performance 
and  monetary  policy  coordination,especially through  the  interdependence of 
interest  rates  for  the  latter. 
While  important,  the  EMS  dimension  does  not  give a  rounded  treatment 
of our  subject.  The  paper  therefore begins  with  a  broader  account  of  how  the 
Community's  economic  policy  system  is developing,  and  where  it may  be  heading. 
And  a  later section discusses a  wider  spread of adjustment  policy  issues  that 
concern  much  of  western  Europe. 
In  discussing action  in  the  framework  of  the  European  Community 
I  distinguish  three  types: 
•  •community  action•  through  external  negotiation,  or  functions  based  on 
Community  legislation,  financial  instruments or other mechanisms; 
•  'hard coordination•  in  the  sense of action  by  Member  States  linked  closel} 
to  Community  mechanisms,  Decisions  or  Directives; 
•  •soft  coordination•  in  the  sense of action  by  Member  States  subject  to 
influence by  mutual  demonstration  effects and  Community  texts  that  define a 
common  philosophy,  or quantitative or qualitative policy guidelines. 2.-
2.  Forms  of  Community  action and  coordination 
2.1  The  broad  brush 
Table  1  p~ovides a  schema  of  how  the  Community  dimension  affects the 
main  domains  of  economic  policy at present. 
The  external  monetary  functions  are  represented  by  the  European  Mon-
etary  System  (EMS)  and  the  Community's  collective role  in  influencing 
policy of  the  IMF  and  in monetary  relations with  the other  economic  powers. 
I  classify the  EMS  principally as  hard  coordination,  since it operates 
through  the  interventions of  national  central  banks  according  to precise 
Community  rules.  In  part,  however,  it becomes  a  matter  of  Community  action 
when  central  rates are  realigned,  when  its credit mechanisms  are used,  or 
when  the  rules are  changed. 
In  domestic  monetary  policy  there  is an  element  of  hard  coordination 
in  that  interest  rate policies  tend  to  follow  very  substantially from  the 
dictates of  the  EMS  commitment  (we  shall  analyse this more  precisely below). 
Softer  coordination  is  seen  in debate  on  the  role and  rigour  to  be  given 
to  domestic  monetary  policy,  and  in  the  choice of  techniques  in  the  setting 
of money  supply or  credit objectives  having  in mind  the  EMS  exchange  rate 
commitment. 
Budgetary  policy  sees  some  Community  action  in  the  sense of  the 
Community  budget's  small  (2  1/2%)weight  in  the totality of public  expenditure 
and  taxation.  It  is occasionally the subject of  hard  coordination  in  the 
sense of  a  collectively organised and  calculated shift  in policy  (e.g.  July 
1978  concerted action),  or  the  negotiation of policy-conditional  balance 
of  payments  loans.  It  is more  often  the  subject of  soft  coordination  in  the 
annual  adoption of  budget  policy guidelines  by  the  Council. 
Trade  policy  is  the  subject  of  negotiation  by  the  Commission  with 
third countries  and  in  the  GATT.  This  does  not  exclude activity at  the 
Member  State  level,  but  where  trade promotion  or  restraint efforts  go 
beyond  certain  limits  they  are  circumscribed  by  common  rules.  Competition 
policy  sees  certain  legal  powers  vested  in  the  Commission  and  Court  of  Justice. 
Structural  policies  cover  a  mixed  bag  of activities - energy,  sectors 
and  industrial  branches,  regional  problems,  the promotion  of  investment  etc. (2) 
2a.-
Table  1:  Schema  of  domains  of  Community  action and  coordination  in  economic  policy 
Form  of action with  Community  dimensions 
C  .  .  ( 1)  h  d  d'  .  (2)  f  d'  .  (3)  ommun1ty  act1on  ar  coor  1nat1on  so  t  coor  1nat1on 
Domain  of  policy 
requiring  adjust-
ment 
external  monetary  some  yes 
domestic  monetary  some  yes 
budgetary  some  some  yes 
trade and  competition  yes  some 
structural  (energy,  some  some  some 
industrial,  regional •••  ) 
incomes  some 
(1)  Community  action  •••  external  negotiation or  functions  based  on  Community 
Legislation,  financial  instruments  or other operational 
mechanisms. 
(2)  Hard  coordination  •••  action  by  Member  States  linked  closely to  Community 
mechanisms,  or  Decisions or  Directives. 
(3)  Soft  coordination  •••  action  by  Member  States  subject  to  influence by  mutual 
demonstration  effects and  texts  defining  common  philosophy, 
and  policy  intentions  in quantitative or qualitative  forms. 3.-
Community  action  started with  the  vesting of  large  legal  and  financial 
intervention powers  in  the  Commission  and  Council  for  steel,  coal  and 
agriculture.  More  recently,  it has  been  growing  through  the  investment 
financing  in  the  domains  of  regional  and  energy  policy  (European  Investment 
Bank,  New  Community  Instrument  for  loans,  as  well  as  the  Community  Budget 
for  interest-rate subsidies and  grants).  Hardish  coordination  is  in 
evidence  in  the  energy  sector  in  the working  out  of quantified targets  for 
energy  interdependence,  and  in  the monitoring of national  regional  aids. 
The  present mandatory  steel  quota  system  is a  strong  Community  action, 
preceded and  likely to  be  followed  for  a  while  through  hard  coordination 
in  the  form  of  voluntary  production  quotas  production quotas.  Soft  coordin-
ation  (with  hard  edges)  is present  in  the  debate over  degrees  of  inter-
ventionism  in  industrial  policy more  broadly. 
Incomes  policy  is a  major  domain  of  soft  coordination  through 
mutual  demonstration  effects;  it is arguable  that  the  Community  is and 
should  be  moving  towards  harder  coordination over  such  questions as  wage 
indexation and  the adjustment  of  the working-time. 4 .-
2.2  Macroeconomic  policy coordination  in more  detail 
The  form  of  economic  policy  coordination has  been  continuing  to 
evolve.  In  1974,  at the  time  of  the move  to  the  then-called  'second stage' 
of  the programme  for  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  the general  system  of macro-
economic  policy  coordination was  considerably extended  under  the "Council 
Decision  of  18th  February  1974  on  the attainment of  a  high  degree  of 
convergence  of  the  economic  policies of  the  Member  States of  the  European 
Economic  Community". 
According  to  the  Convergence  Decision  the  Council  of  Finance 
Ministers  shall  meet  monthly,  preceded  by  preparatory meetings  of  the 
Coordinating  Group  (of  high  finance ministry officials,  restricted to one 
per  Member  State).  The  yearly time-table of  work  is divided  into  the three 
seasons  adopted  in  the  Community's  work:  the autumn  round  (September  to 
Christmas,  the  spring  round  (new  year  to  Easter),  the  summer  round  (Easter 
to  the  August  recess). 
The  most  formal,  general  act of  coordination  is  the process  of 
adopting  an  Annual  Report  in  the autumn  round.  Here  the  Convergence  Decision 
required  the  fullest of  Community  procedures:  proposal  by  the  Commission, 
submission  to  Parliament  and  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  for  Opinions, 
and  finally  Decision  by  the  Council  of  Ministers~
1 §ince the  procedure  takes 
about  four  months  to  complete  (from  preparation by  the  Commission  of  new 
economic  forecasts  by  the  end  of  September,  to  Decision  on  the text  by  the 
Council  in  December)  it is  hardly  surprising  that  the  Annual  Report  is not 
the  vehicle  for  'hot'  coordinated decision-making.  It should  rather  be  seen 
as  the  vehicle  for  producing,  through  extensive participation of all  the 
institutions,  a  common  reference document,  defining  the current  stance of 
policy  in an  ordered and  comprehensive  way  with  related economic  fore-
casts and  a  quantification of budgetary  and  monetary  policy objectives for 
the  year  ahead.  It maintains  a  regular analysis and  supply of selected 
statistics.  In  this  way  the  Annual  Economic  Report  is  closer  in  function 
to  the  similarly named  documents  of  the  United  States  Council  of  Economic 
Advisers  (CEA),  or of  the German  federal  ministry of  economics. 
The  spring  round  is characterised by  a simpler  review  of 
whether  the  policy  stance adopted  in  the  Annual  Report  is still appropriate; 
(1)  See  circuit 1  in Graph  1. 4a.-
Graph  1:  Circuits  of  Economic  Policy  Coordination  in the  European  Community 
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by  inviting  the  Council  to  put  an 
agreement  of  principle into effect. 
COUNCIL  OF  FINANCE 
MINISTERS  (1) 
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Circuit  3 
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Member  State requests  change 
through  initial  consultations 
with  CGCB,  MC  & Commission, 
the  Council  decides,  and  CGCB 
puts  into effect • 
(1>  Council  presidency by  Member  State for  six months,  fixed  country order  for  succession. 
<2>  President  elected  from  among  officials of  Member  States  for  two  years;  Secretariat provided by  Commission  staff. 
<3>  President  eleited from  among  governors  for  one  year. s~-
this  is discussed  in  the  Council  of  Finance  Ministers generally  in  March. 
The  summer  round  is  characterised by  a  first  confidential  discussion of 
guidelines  for  budget  policy  for  the  following  calendar year.  All  Member 
States  now  having  a  coincidence of  calendar and  budget  years  except  the 
United  Kingdom:  a  reform  of  U.K.  budgetary  practice at  some  stage,  perhaps 
aligning  both  the  tax  and  public  expenditure processes  together~n the  calendar 
year,  would  be  helpful  • 
A new  tier to  these procedures  was  grafted on  to  the three annual  phases 
of  the  Convergence  Decision  when  the  European  Council  (Heads  of State or 
Government),  decided  in  1974  to  install a  fixed  rhythm  to their  Summits, 
meeting  towards  the  end  of  the  three  seasons  in  March/April,  June/July and 
November/December.  The  established practice  now  is  for  the  Commission  to 
send  a  short  Communication  of  the general  economic  situation to  each  of  these 
meetings,  and  this  conveniently  emerges  at  end  of  each  phase of  work  done 
.  h  f  k  f  h  .  .  (1)  1n  t  e  ramewor  o  t  e  Convergence  Dec1s1on. 
The  summer  European  Council  in  turn  now  tends  to  be  fitted  in  with 
the  timing  of  the  annual  summit  of  the  seven  Largest  western  industrialised 
countries,  Bonn  1978,  Tokyo  1979,  Venice  1980,  Ottawa  1981.  The  European 
Council  tends  to  meet  in  June  or  July about  10  days  before  the western 
economic  summit.  Examples  of  the  same  economic  dossiers  being  treated  in 
the  successive  European  and  industrialised world  summits  are the  budget  policy 
adjustments  of  1978,  and  the  setting of  energy  policy targets  in 1979. 
The  Convergence  Decision of  1974  was  perhaps  over ambitious  in  that 
its procedures  rested  upon  a  now  somewhat  dated  view  of  fine-tuning  of 
budgetary  policy,  and  an  optimistic  view  the  extent  to  which  the  locus of 
macroeconomic  decision-taking  that  rests on  national  legislation and  power 
might  shift  from  the  furnace  of  national  politics to  the conference chambers 
of Brussels.  It may  have  misjudged  budgetary  policy to  have  been  more  of a 
candidate  for  hard  coordination  than  seems  to  be  the case.  It nonetheless 
provides  still  the  essential  procedural  infrastructure for  general  economic, 
as  opposed  to  purely monetary,  policy consideration. 
Monetary  and  exchange  rate policy  has  its own  infrastructure,  based 
on  the  twinned  Monetary  Committee  (finance ministry and  central  bank 
representatives)  and  Committee  of  Governors  of  Central  Banks  (central  banks 
(1)  See  circuit  2  in  Graph  1. 6.-
alone).  The  latter meets  at  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements at Bale, 
despite a  brass-plate  location of  the  European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund(EMCF) 
in  Luxembourg.  The  EMCF  is  essentially the accounting  mechanism  of  the  EMS. 
Both  these  Committees  meet  monthly,  handling  a  range  of  business 
that divides  into  three  categories:  (i)  development  and  management  of  the 
European  Monetary  System,  Cii)  preparation of  Community  joint positions  in 
negotiations  in  the  IMF  - for  example  over  the  role of  the  SDR  and  the 
adjustment  quotas,  and  Ciii)  discussion of  current  issues of  monetary  policy 
coordination,  for  example  interest  rate policy. 
When  the  European  Monetary  System  was  started,  it was  widely  considered 
that  the  system  of  coordination  should  be  strengthened.  From  the  foregoing, 
it will  be  evident  why  it did  not  prove  necessary  to  create any  more  Committees. 
More  significantly,  birth of  the  EMS  had  the  following  effects: 
(i)  Exchange  rate policy  was  brought  back  into  the  regular  Community  bodies, 
as  opposed  to  being  the  preserve of a  sub-club of  central  bankers  meeting 
under  the  'Snake'  appellation  (Latterly only Germany,  Belgium,  Nether-
lands  and  Denmark); 
Cii)  for  the  first  time,  Community  budget  and  investment  loan  financing 
instruments  were  Linked  to  the  Community's  monetary activities, notably 
to  help  the potentially weak  currencies of  the  EMS  ensure against  adverse 
effects on  their  economic  development; 
(iii)  the  divergence  indicator  was  introduced,  carrying  with  it two  elements 
of  Community  doctrine:(1) 
(a)  the objective of  symmetry,  or  fair balance, for  signalling which 
countries  should  be  expected  to adjust  policy  when  exchange  rates 
diverged; 
(b)  a  sequence  of  possible actions  for  the divergent  country,  notably 
- interest  rates 
- other  policies 
- realignment; 
Civ)  the  emphasis  put  on  the  ECU,  and  on  the  use  of  Community  currencies 
for  central  bank  intervention  Cas  opposed  to  the  exclusive  use of  the 
dollar),  has  intensified awareness  of  the  potential  for  a  more  strongly 
articulated policy  vis-a-vis  the dollar and  yen,  as  regards  exchange 
rates  and·  interest  rates. 
(1)  See  circuit 3  in Graph  1  on  the  channels of  consultation  involved  in  EMS 
parity changes. 7.-
For  completeness,  one  should  add  that  the Economic  Policy  Committee 
has  also  tended  to  become  more  active, partly  in preparatory  functions  in 
relation  to  the  Council  and  Coordinating  Group's  regular  cycles of  work 
(e.g.  reviewing  short-term  forecasts,  partly with  work  on  special  tasks 
preparing,  for  example,  as at present,  a  draft medium-term  programme  for  1980-
1985,  and  in  the  recent  past  positions on  aspects of energy  policy,  the 
adaptation of  working  time,  and  the  role of the  Community  budget  and  loan 
finance  in  relation  to  the  European  Monetary  System. 
Looking  to  the  future,  I  might  hazard a  few  guesses  as  to  how  the 
European  economic  policy  system  in  general  might  develop. 
In  the monetary  area,  the passing  to  the  institutional  phase  of  the 
EMS,  with  setting  up  of  a  European  Monetary  Fund  ·(EMF)  was  scheduled  for 
about  now,  but  is  already  behind  the  time-table originally conceived.  How-
ever,  ideas  have  developed  in  the  intervening  psriod,  and  some  of  the poten-
tial  next  functions  of  the  system  are becoming  clearer.  They  consist  - in 
my  schema  - of  passing  more  matter  from  the  hard or  soft  coordination  cate-
gories  to  Community  action,  centered  round  the potential  functions  of  the 
ECU  and  the  EMF.  The  ECU  has  potential  for a  fuller  role  in  the  transactions 
between  Community  central  banks  and  in  the  structure of  reserve assets;  it 
has  as  yet  unexploited potential  for  use  in private  international  capital 
markets  and  for  public  bond  issues  by  Community  and·  national  authorities 
in  international  markets;  and  for  use  in  the  coordination of  Community 
central  banking  activity with  that of other major  monetary  powers.  These 
various  functions  would  come  together  and  have  enormously  greater potential 
if put  together  with  an  EMF  having  operational  powers  to execute market 
transactions  in  ECU  denominated  financial  assets  (see other  conference 
contributors  for  more  detailed  ideas). 
On  budgetary  policy,  the experience of  the mature  federations  suggests 
that  the  sharing  of  formal  powers  to  decide state taxation and  public  expen-
diture  is  extremely difficult to arrange.  Deficits  financing  by  states 
tends  to  be  heavily  limited  by  the  constitution or  by  the effective powers 
of  the  federal  authorities.  However,  power  to adjust  local  taxation  and 
public  expenditure  tends  to  be  Left  to decentralised decision-making,  subject 
only  to  broad  constitutional  rules  and  to  economic  constraints  (e.g.  over-
taxed  localities  Lose  population or enterprises  through  out-migration). 8.-
In  the  United  States,  the  federal  authorities  regard  the  expen-
diture  intentions of  state and  Local  governments  as  hardly more  susceptible 
to  influence  than  those  of  the private sector.  In  Switzerland,  the 
Confederal  authorities address  to  the  cantons  only  the  broadest  general 
recommendations  by  way  of  budget  policy guidelines.  Germany  has  a  more 
elaborate  system  for  cooperation  between  Bund  and  Lander,  although  it 
still seems  difficult  in  practice to  dissuade  Land  and  Local  government 
from  procyclical  investment  expenditure  when  their tax  revenues  rise 
cyclically.  In  some  federationsp  state budget  policy  is  subject  to  episodic 
agreements  on  specific,  concerted policy moves,  and  regular  'jaw-boning' 
on  desirable priorities.  By  comparison  the  Community's  existing  procedure 
(under  the  1974  Convergence  Decision)  for  setting  budget  policy guidelines 
annually  for all  Member  States  is  an  ambitious  arrangement.  The  •concerted 
action'  decision  of  July  1978  was  a  significant policy move  taken  in  this 
framework,  Linked,  it should also  be  added,  to  the  Bonn  Summit  of  the  seven 
major  industrialised countries of  the  OECD  area.  The  decision  in autumn 
1980  not  to  respond  to  the  second  oil  shock  with  compensatory  demand  expan-
sionary measures  also  amounted  to  a  significant collective orientation of 
policy  (see  Annual  Economic  Report  1980-81,  European  Economy,  November  1980). 
In  the  Community  one  could  conceive of  a  greater  use  of policy-
conditional  credits  to  Member  States,  although  one  would  expect  Community 
Member  States generally  to  be  able  to  avoid getting  into situations of 
such  grave  financial  crisis that  call  for  such  IMF-type  credits.  The 
Community's  own  balance of  payments  Loan  facility  has  been  used  by  Italy 
and  Ireland  in  the past.  Moreover,  in  the  recent  renewal  of  this  facility 
in  February  1980,  the  regulations governing  this  instrument  were  adjusted 
in  the direction of  enabling  it to  be  used  with  varied  form  of  condition-
ality at  earlier  stages  of  financial  difficulty.  However,  it can  be  argued 
that  other  types  of  conditional  credit and  subsidies  have  a  more  promising 
future  in  the  Community's  institutional  setting:  on  the one  hand,  grants  or 
Loans  Linked  to  projects of  programmes  of  specific  policy  interest  to  the 
Community  (e.g.  energy,  regional,  manpower  retraining),  or,  on  the other 
hand,  such  arrangements  as  seen  in  the  EMS  whereby  the acceptance of  an 
exchange  rate  commitment  is  accompanied  by  a  multi-year  programme  of  grants 
and  Loans  to  boost  the  economic  development  of  the  Less  prosperous  Member 
States.  In  the  fiscal  domain  there are proposals  for  harmonised  initiatives 
beyond  the major  VAT  reforms  already achieved.  An  energy  consumption  or  import 
tax  initiative was  floated  in  1980,  and  there are  negotiations  under  way (3) 
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concerning  some  other major  excises  (e.g.  on  beverages  and  alcohol  where 
there_are  issues  of  trade policy). 
On  incomes  and  employment  policies one  could  envisage  some  extra-
polation of  the Tripartite Conference  (of  which  there were  some  first 
experience  in  the  mid-nineteen  seventies)  for  arranging  European 
'understandings'  on  wage  bargaining  as  part of  some  wider  concerted  economic 
policy,  for  example  in  response  to  common  external  shocks  of  which  the 
oil  price  rises  have  given  painful  examples.  One  obvious  issue  for  concertation 
between  the  social  partners and  government  in a  Community  aiming  at monetary 
integration  is  that of  indexation,  and  not  only of  incomes  but  also of 
other  forms  of  contract  and  monetary  asset.  The  question of adjustments 
to  working  time  has  also  been  pursued  vigourously  ~t the  European  Trade 
Unions  Confederation,  and  this  could  come  to  be  treated more  operationally 
at  the  level  of  its  European  dimension. 
These  examples  suggest  that  the  Community's  policy system  may  tend 
to grow  up  in part around  a  considerable variety of  'hard'  monetary, 
fiscal  and  financial  instruments  linked often  to  both  sectoral  or micro 
as  well  as  macroeconomic  policy.  In  addition  there will  no  doubt  be 
continuing  efforts  to  strengthen  the broader  'soft'  coordination of  economic 
policy.  However,  this  is  likely to  develop  more  through  the  succession of 
ad  hoc  episodes  concerned  with  particular needs,  than  some  kind  of  smooth 
osmosis  through  different  dosages  of  power-sharing  over  the 
main  instruments  of  budgetary  policy.  More  likely is a  framework  for  coordin-
ation  which  can  episodically go  hard  in  circumstances  that deliver  a  clear 
benefit  for  some  or all, and  without  entailing a  permanent  loss of  power 
for  national  governments.  Monetary  policy would  be  the exception  case,  likely 
to move  more  into  both  hard  coordination and  Community  action. 
More  generally the  Community  may  be  expected  to operate  under  the 
Pareto  principle of  agreeing  collective action which  increases  the  net  welfare 
of  the whole  through  benefiting at  least  some  Member  States without  inflicting 
a  significant  Loss  on  any,  or,if there  is  the danger  of the  latter,compensating 
the  loser.'1)  This  principle  is of  course  fundamental  to all organisations 
(1)  e.g.  the  budgetary  compensation  paid  to  Ireland and  Italy  in  joining the  EMS. 
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governed  more  or  less  by  unanimity  rules.  The  Community's  particular potential 
here  is that  it is a  multiple purpose and  multiple  instrument organisation 
that  should  be  able  to  exploit many  opportunities,  created by  increasing 
interdependence,  for  useful  action obeying  the Pareto principle.  Thus 
complicated negotiation around  linked  issues,  sometimes  decried as  a  malady 
of  the  European  Community,  contrasting with  concepts  of  ideal  collective 
behaviour,  are  to  be  expected as  long  as  there  is  refusal of more  extended 
majority  voting.  This  degree of  complication,  with  its admittedly unpopular 
aspects  Clack  of  transparency,  unclear  links to basic  political objectives), 
should  nonethelss  permit  the  Community  to be  useful  where  single purpose,  or 
single  instrument  international organisations get  blocked.  However, 
Community  action  can  over-burden  itself by  aiming  too often at a  simultaneous 
combination  of  immediate  benefits and  correspondence with  a  future  stage of 
constitutional  development.  To  be  more  selective and  practical  could, 
for  example,  mean  concentrating  on  monetary  union  as  the major  candidate  for 
future  constitutional  changes.  Indeed,  this  is already  the  case:  in  several 
other  domains  (energy,  industry,  regional)  where  a  'Community  policy'  is 
being  sought,  no  basic  change  in  the constitution is at present  envisaged. 
Only  in  the  foreign  policy area  is there talk of  a  new  Treaty  (viz. 
Herr  Genscher's  ideas). 11.-
3.  Adjustment  centered around  the  European  Monetary  System 
The  premises  behind  the  commitment  to  fixed  but  adjustable exchange 
rates  in  the  EMS  are that: 
- exchange  rate  changes  have  become  a  weak  instrument  of  balance of  payments 
adjustment  in  the highly  interdependent  European  setting; 
- internal  adjustments  are  therefore  to  be  favoured  as  the basic  rule, 
notably  through  stabilising nominal  incomes  and  directing public  finance 
policy according  to  a  disciplined balance of  resource allocation,  demand 
and  income  distribution objectives; 
exchange  rate  changes  also  need  to  be  minimised  in  Europe  since  they  may 
amplify  inflation differentials and  damage  investment  because of  the 
uncertainty  they  represent  for  enterprises. 
It  is  generally  recognized  that  in  its first  two  years  the  EMS 
delivered,  technically,  what  it was  designed  to provide: 
-Less variability  in  nominal  exchange  rates  (see Table  2).  The  much 
increased  intra-European  exchange  rate stability contrasts  with  the 
volatility of  the dollar,  yen  and  pound  sterling over  this  period,  and 
also  with  the  exchange  rate  instability of participating  Member  States 
over  a  comparable  period  following  the first oil  shock.  The  figures 
suggested are quite striking.  EMS  participants•  exchange  rates  were 
on  average about  as  unstable as  the dollar and  the  pound  sterling  in 
the years  1974  to  1976  after the first oil  shock.  In  1979-80  by  compar-
ison  EMS  participants•  exchange  rates  varied  by  nearly one  third as  much~ 
whereas  the dollar and  pound  sterling  remain  precisely as  unstable as  in 
1974  to  1976.  The  Swiss  franc,  which  has  unilaterally pegged  itself to 
the  DM  has  seen  a  similar stability performance  to  the  EMS  average.  The 
yen,  however,  became  more  unstable  in  the  second  period. 
-manageability of  central  rate adjustments  where  necessary.  There  was  a 
general  realignment  in  September  1979,  a  Danish  devaluation  in  November 
1979,  and  an  Italian devaluation  in  March  1981. 
However,  this short-run satisfecit should  not  be  allowed  to  camouflage 
the  fact  that  the  pursuit of  necessary  internal  economic  adjustments  still 
leaves  a  great  deal  to  be  desired.  Indeed,  intensified adjustments  are  now 11a.-
Table  2:  Variability of  major  currencies against  the  ECU  (1) 
1974  1975  1976  average 
1974-76 
BFR/LFR  20,9  9,6  38,5  23.0 
DKR  15,6  5,7  33,8  18,3 
DM  16,9  7,7  42,7  22,3 
FF  22,0  26,9  30,1  26,3 
IRL  19,2  28,3  63,5  37,0 
LIT  33,9  14,3  55,5  34,6 
HFL  17,1  6,4  39,0  20,8 
average  EMS (2)  20,8  14,1  43,3  26,3 
UKL  19,2  28,5  63,3  37,0 
FS  22,6  43,5 
USD  25,7  47,5  20,1  31,1 
Yen  34,1 
1979  1980  average 
1979-80 
8,4  9,0  8,7 
32,7  4,5  18,6 
8,6  9,6  9,1 
7,4  6,1  6,6 
7,7  9,2  8,5 
9,8  17,9  13,6 
9,0  4,4  6,7 
11,9  8,7  10,3 
32,2  44,7  38,5 
10,5  13,0  11,6 
28,1  34,4  31,2 
87,5  82,1  85 
(1)  Coefficient of  variation  (standard deviation of  end-of-month  rates  for 
each  national  currency against  the  ECU  divided  by  the average  rate for 
the year).  Results multiplied by  1000. 
(2)  Unweighted  mean 
Source:  Commission  services. 12.-
urgently  called  for  if the achievements  of the  EMS  are not  to  be  eroded. 
I  propose  to  review  these problems  in terms  of the three prime 
d  .  f  h  b"l"  (1)  eterm1nants  o  exc  ange  rate sta  1 1ty: 
- inflation differentials 
- interest  rates 
- balance of  payments  current  accounts. 
A fourth  factor  is  the exchange  market  interventions of central 
banks  which  can  be  important  especially on  month  by  month  basis.  Moreover 
the accumulation  or  erosion of central  bank  reserves  can  often allow  the 
authorities  to  lean  against  the wind  forperiods of  years.  However,  a  clear 
account  of  the  intervention policies must  await  a  more  detailed and  earlier 
availability of  the  relevant statistics than  is  so  far  the  case.  For  the 
other main  determinants  of  exchange  rates  Table  3  and  4  give an 
assessment  of  the  present situation,  in  terms  of  upward,  or downward,  or 
neutral  pressures.  The  overall  picture is a  mosaic  of  conflicting pressures, 
but  this  is  hardly  surprising  since the  exchange  rates of  EMS  participants 
are by  their  nature equilibrium market  rates, maintained  in nearly fixed 
positions  by  an  interplay of private market  forces  and  central  bank  action. 
(1)  For  a  theoretical  and  econometric  review  along  these  lines see  Rudiger 
Dornbusch"Exchange  Rate  Economies:  Where  do  we  stand?".,  Brookings 
Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  1:  1980. 12a.-
Table  3:  A quantitative assessment  of  influences on  exchange  rates  in spring  1981 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
United  Kingdom 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Greece 
EC 
Inflation (1) 
performance: 
in  percentages 
1981 
(forecasts) 
4,5 
11,8 
18,7 
11,0 
6,2 
6,3 
9,0 
16,0 
21,5 
10,4 
!nterest rates 
nominal  rates  real  rates 
short '2\ong (3)  Long  <4) 
13,4  10,3  5,5 
12,9  15,0  2,9 
19,0  18,1  0,5 
12,6  13,4  2,2 
17,0  13,6  7,0 
10,3  11,4  4,8 
15,2  18,4  8,6 
14,6  16,1  0,1 
13,8  13,4  2,7 
Balance  of payments 
current  accounts:  % of  GOP 
1981  1981  comp- 1970-80 
(fore- ared  to  average 
casts) 1970-80 
average 
-1,6  -2,2  0,6 
-1,7  -1,3  -0,4 
-1,4  -1,3  -0,1 
0,3  1,0  -0,7 
-6,6  -7,1  0,5 
-0,9  -1,9  1,0 
-3,6  -1,2  -2,4 
-11,4  -6,9  -4,5 
-2,9 
-1,5  -1,5  0,0 
Source:  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  European  Economy,  N°7  November  1980 
and  N°8  March  1981,  and  Supplement  A,  N°5  May  1981. 
(1)  private consumption  deflator 
(2)  three-month  rates at  end  of  March  1981 
(3)  bond  rates,  average  in  March  1981 
(4)  deflated  by  1981  forecast  as  in  first  column. 12b.-
Table  4:  A qualitative assessment  of  influences on  exchange  rate~  in spring  1981 
Relative  Relative  interest  rates  Relative balance of  ~a~ments 
inflation  ± 2X  over  EC  averase  current accounts  medium-term 
performance:  nominal  rates  real  rates  ~ 1X.of  GOP  over  oil  import 
!  2X  over  EC  EC  average  dependence, 
average  projected 
trend 
1981  short  Long  Long  1981  1981  comp- 1975-1990 
ared  to 
1970-80 
average (1) 
Germany  up  down  up  down 
France 
Italy  down  up  up  down 
United  Kingdom  up  up 
Belgium  up  up  up  down  down 
Netherlands  up  down  down  up  .. 
Denmark  up  up  down 
Ireland  down  up  down  down  down 
Greece  down  down 
1up'  = factor  representing  an  upward  influence on  the  exchange  rate 
= factor  representing  a  neutral  influence on  the  exchange  rate 
'down'  = factor  representing  a  downward  influence on  the  exchange  rate 
Note:  All  assessments are based  on  data  appearing  in Table 3,.  except  for 
the  last  colum  which  is based  on  Table 7. 
(1)  i.e.  each  country's  change  in  1981  compared  to  its 1970-80  average,  compared 
to  the  corresponding  change  for  the  Community  average. 
down 
up 
down 
up 
down 
down 
down 13.-
3.1  Inflation differentials 
The  purchasing  power  parity  (p.p.p.)  theory  holds  that  exchange 
rate  changes  will  tend  to  cancel  out  differences  in  inflation  rates.  In 
the  Long-run  (beyond  10  years)  p.p.p.  theory  holds  up  quite well.  On  a 
short-run basis  (say  one  year)  it may  be  no  guide at all.  The  important 
questions  here  are  in  what  degree  deviations  from  p.p.p.  mean  building  up 
inevitable future  exchange  rate  changes,  and  in what  degree  they  reflect 
structural factors that  can  enable  such  changes  in  the  terms  of  trade  to  be 
sustained. 
The  record of  the  Member  States  in  relation  to all  industrialised 
countries over  the  1970s  is  summarised  in  Table  4  using  unit  Labour  cost 
data.  Of  the  four  Large  Member  States,  the p.p.p.  rule applied most  exactly 
to  Italy and  France.  In  the  Italian case  unit  Labour  costs  rose  on  average 
6,7%  faster  than  in  competing  countries,  against  which  the effective  exchange 
rate depreciated 6,5%  annually.  In  the  French  case  (as  in  that  of  Denmark) 
a  near  average  unit  Labour  cost  performance  corresponded  with  approximate 
stability of  the effective exchange  rate.  Germany,  however,  sustained a 
2%  annual  average  real  increase of  unit  Labour  costs,  with  the  5%  effective 
exchange  rate gain  going  beyond  the  3%  relative decline  in  unit  Labour  costs 
in  OM  compared  to  competitors  in  their currencies.  The  United  Kingdom 
emerges  from  the  decade  as  a  whole  with  an  even  Larger  4%  real  annual  average 
increase  in  unit  Labour  costs,  the  7%  relative unit  Labour  cost  rise  in 
pounds  being  offset by  only a  3%  effective  exchange  rate depreciation. 
This  real  increase  in  costs occurred  entirely  in 1979  and  1980,  after many 
years  in  which  the  exchange  rate depreciated  by  more  than  the  United· Kingdom's 
relative unit  Labour  cost  increases.  This  reversal  in  exchange  rate perfor-
mance  is  much  due  to  the  combination of  the oil price  rise and  a  severe 
domestic  stabilisation policy. 
Among  the  smaller  Member  States,  the Benelux  countries  have  accumu-
lated  real  unit  Labour  cost  increases of  about  1%  per  annum,  reflecting 
low  cost  increases  but  even  stronger  exchange  rates.  The  Dutch  case,  Like 
that  of  the  United  Kingdom  more  recently,  reflects  Large  terms  of  trade 
gains  through  the  rise  in  the price of  its natural  gas,  and  so  has  not, 
unlike  in  the  Belgian  case,  been  accompanied  by  the  emergence  of  a  Large 
balance  of  payments  deficit.  But  since  the  Dutch  gas  reserves are  now 
sharply declining,  both  countries are faced  now  at  the outset of  the  1980s 
with  major  problems  of  adjusting  from  positions of  weak  industrial  compet-
itivity. 13a.-
Table  5:  Exchange rate changes in relation to differential trends in unit labour costs, 1970-80 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
United  Kingdom 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
(1)  In  national 
1 • 
Unit  labour 
costs  (1) 
2. 
Relative 
unit  labour 
costs 
(1)  (2) 
3. 
Effective 
exchange 
rate  chan:Je(2) 
-=appreciation 
+=depreciation 
4. 
Real  relative 
unit  labour 
costs (3) 
------ annual  average  percentage  changes -----
5,3  -3,0  -5,2  2,0 
8,7  0,6  0,2  0,4 
14,5  6,7  6,5  0,2 
15,2  7,3  3,1  4,0 
6,5  -1,3  -2,2  0,8 
8,1  -0,4  -0,2  -0,2 
14,9  4,6  3,2  1,2 
6,2  -1,7  -2,8  1,0 
currencies. 
(2)  Relative to  17  principal  OECD  countries, trade-weighted. 
(3)  Column  3  less  column  2  (more  precisely,  index  numbers  are  multiplicative). 
Source:  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  "Unit  labour  costs  in  manufacturing", 
~urooean Economy  N°  8,  March  1981. 14.-
Turning  to  present  price performance,  Table 3  reminds  us  that 
Germany  and  the  Benelux  countries are at present significantly  less 
inflationary  in  terms  of  consumer  prices than  the  Community  average;  France, 
Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom  are about  average,  and  Italy,  Ireland and 
Greece  are significantly more  inflationary than  the average. 
The  Community 1s  clear  interest  is  in a  downward  convergence  of 
inflation  rates  for  at  least  three  reasons:  firstly,  low  inflation  is a 
common  economic  objective,  secondly,  a  convergence  on  low  inflation is  seen 
as a  prerequisite  for  further  monetary  integration, and  thirdly,  the pattern 
of  inflation differentials  compensated  by  exchange  rate changes  is seen as 
being  harmful  to  trade and  investment  within a  highly  interdependent 
economic  structure  like the  Community.  This  makes  it pertinent  to  examine 
trends  in  convergence  performance of  the  Community  as  a  whole,  and  the 
performance of  individual  Member  States.  Measured  in  terms  of  the  standard 
deviation of  consumer  price  increases,  the average  rate of  increase,  and 
the  gap  between  the  highest  and  lowest  price increases,  the  evidence  in 
Graph  I  points  disturbingly  to almost  as  severe a  deterioration  now  in  1981 
following  the  second oil shock  as  in 1974-75  after the first oil  shock. 
As  regards  individual  Member  States,  the Benelux  countries  have 
kept  closer  to  the  German  performance  than  in 1974-75  when  they  strayed for 
a  while  into more  inflationary ways.  The  EMS  and  1Snake 1  before it have  certainly 
been  important  influences.  Keeping  to  the  1Snake 1  in  the mid-seventies pre-
vented  the  Benelux  countries  from  departing  into a  vicious  circle of  devaluation 
and  inflation.  But  this also  resulted,  as mentioned,  in  their having  to  face 
the  second  oil  shock  in a  weak  competitive  condition,  and  this  in  turn  is 
curbing  any  new  acceleration of  inflation even  more  strongly. 
France  and  Denmark  have  broadly  speaking  remained  average  performers 
on  inflation,  although  a  fairly strict  incomes  policy  in  Denmark  may  now 
be  bringing  somewhat  improved  results. 
From  the  stand-point of  the  EMS,  the trio Ireland,  Italy,  United 
Kingdom  have  offered a  paradoxical  spectacle.  Ireland and  Italy,  have  not 
improved  their  relatively bad  inflation performance  since  joining  the  EMS. 
The  United  Kingdom,  on  the other  hand,  after staying out  because of 
deflationary fears,  has  since  introduced - with  of  course a  change  of  government  -Source 
14a.-
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the  sternest anti-inflationary turn of  policy of all  Member  States  during 
the  Life  to date of  the  EMS.  An  observer  from  Mars  might  be  forgiven  for 
assuming  some  accidental  role  reversal. 
Income  behaviour  bargaining  suggests a  more  favourable picture of 
convergence  trends.  One  major  difference  between  the  1980-81  episode,  compared 
to 1974-75  after  the first oil  shock,  has  been  de  facto  acceptance  -
revealed  by  the statistics - of  an  approximate  pause  in  the  growth  of  real 
wage  incomes  at  present;  whereas  in  1974-75  real  Labour  costs  per  unit of 
output  grew  in  total  by  5%  causing  a  catastrophic  fall  in  corporate 
f .  b . L  .  ( 1)  h  L .  .  th  . f  pro  1ta  1  1ty.  Moreover,  t  e  present  rea  1ncome  pause  1s  ra  er  un1  orm 
as  between  Member  States, as against  big  differences  in 1974-75. 
aut  the  convergence  in  real  wage  bargaining  results - while  useful 
compared  to  the  1974-75  example,  has  not  brought  with  it sufficient progress 
in adjusting  nominal  wage  bargaining  habits,  or  in accepting  sufficient  real 
wage  adjustments  in  some  of  the  Least  competitive and  most  inflationary  Member 
States  <e.g.  Belgium  and  Italy respectively).Both  these countries  have  not 
altered their  comprehensive  and  rapid-acting  systems  of  wage  indexation 
on  prices  in spite of  the  new  oil  price  shock.  Denmark  and  the Netherlands, 
on  the other  hand,  have  taken  some  such  steps  to  limit  the  repercussion 
of oil  prices  into  wage  inflation.  A clear doctrine  has  been  spelt out  by 
the  Community.  Thus  in  the  Annual  Economic  Report  for  1980-81  the  Commission 
argued  in  November  1980:  "It remains  h;ghly desirable,  nonetheless  that  such 
indexation mechanisms  as  do  exist are used  with  sufficient flexibility or 
limitations to  avoid passing on,  into  wages,  unavoidable  terms  of  trade  losses, 
and  to  allow  other  necessary adjustments  in  income  distribution or  tax  structure 
without  causing  extra  inflation''.  The  Finance  Council  for  its part, adopted 
this  language  in  its December  Decision. 
But  by  the  spring  of  1981  efforts  to  suspend  wage  indexation  had  brought  the 
fall  of  the  Belgian  Government,  while  in  Italy the Government  has  been  en-
deavouring  after  the  devalu~tion of  the  Lire on  23rd  March  1981  to  renew 
its efforts to  persuade  the  social  partners to  limit  wage  indexation. 
The  European  Council  of  23rd  March  1981  for  its part  raised  the  issue 
very  clearly  in  concluding:"High  and  divergent  inflation  rates are a  threat 
both  to  the prospects of  growth  and  to  the  economic  and  monetary  cohesion 
(1)"Annual  Economic  Review'1980-81,  Table  2.6,  'European  Economy•  N°  7, 
November  1980. 16.-
of  the  Community.  In  this  context  the  European  Council  also  discussed 
the effects  caused  by  rigid systems  of  indexation of  incomes  and  expressed 
the opinion  that  an  adjustment  of  such  mechanisms  should  be  considered". 
\ 17.-
3.2  Interest  rates 
Interest  rates  have  become  the most  powerful,  short-term  instrument 
of  exchange  rate policy  in  the  European  Monetary  System.  In  principle,  the 
monetary  authorities try  to maintain a  relaxed  enough  excha~gemarket situation 
to  permit  interest  rate policy  to  be  guided also  by  domestic  economic  objectives, 
including  the  purs~it of  quantitative monetary  or credit  objecti~es. But 
two  major  factors  keep  interest  rate policy  in  the front-line of  exchange 
rate policy.  Firstly,  long-run  interest  rate differentials are needed  to 
persuade  international  portfolio  investors  to  discount  inflation differentials 
and  the  likelihood at  some  stage of  exchange  rate adjustments;  secondly, 
short-run  interest  rate differentials are the most  powerful  influence over 
the movement  of  foot-Loose  capital  between  convertible currencies.  The  amounts 
.of  capital  moving  across  private  international  financial  markets  are  often 
greater  than  those  involved  in central  bank  intervention and  other officially 
organised capital  movements. 
Since  no  specific mechanism  of  interest  rate coordination  has  been 
set  up  as  a  result  of  the  EMS  (the Bale  monthly  gathering  of  central  bank 
governors,  and  the Monetary  Committee  providing  the  continuing  fora· for 
discussions and  exchange  of  information)  it is  worth  examining  whether  there 
has  been  a  de  facto  convergence  in  interest  rate policies during  the  life 
of  the  EMS.  Those  close  to  policy-making  feel  this to  be  the case.  Others 
may  want  more  convincing.  One  compact  way  of presenting  the  evidence 
is  through  matrices of  correlation coefficients between  interest  rates of the 
relevant  countries,  for  both  short and  long-term assets, during  the period 
before and  since  the  EMS  was  set  up.  This  data  is set out  in Table  6,  in which 
the  two-year  period before  the  EMS  begins  with  when  France  left the  •snake', 
and  the  EMS  period  is  from  April  1979  to  February  1981. 
For  short-time  interest  rates,  which  are  the most  crucial  for  exchange 
markets,  the  correlation of movements  in  the  rates  has  been  stronger.  Indeed, 
as  would  be  expected a  priori,  French  and  Italian  rates  have  seen  since  the 
EMS  started a  radical  increase  in  their  correlation on  average  Community  interest 
rates  (from  0,13  to  0,96  for  France,  and  from  0,29  to  0,79  for  Italy>. 
The  increase  in  correlation of  Franco-German  rates  has  been  equally  imperative 
(from  0,05  to  0,84>.  Meanwhile  the correlation of  French  and  Italian  rates 
on  those of  the  United  States fell  from  a  high  to a  rather 17a.-
Table 6  :  Correlation coefficients between  interest  rates before and  after introduction of the 
European  Nonetary  Syste• 
(line 1  :  NarCh1977  to Narch  1979  Cbefore.~NS) 
Cline  2  :  April  1979  to February  1981  <since  ENS) 
Short-ter~~ interes.t .rates  (1) 
EC(2)  OK  D  F  IRL  I  Nt.  8  UK 
I  us 
EC(2)  .126  .535  .126  .534  .287  .537  .792  .628  .215 
.751  .917  .960  .460  .787  .794  .936  .904  .362 
OK  .374  .234  .430  .067  •  110  .019  .363  .196 
.558  .782  .629  .365  .619  .751  .790  .093 
D  .049  .136  .641  .075  .245  .128  .240 
.844  .184  .833  .601  .794  .685  .445 
f  .773  .579  .575  .309  .740  .803 
.557  .621  .791  .945  .866  .359 
IRL  .375  .632  .495  .966  .782 
.080  .. 633  .651  .583  .185 
I  .569  .136  .286  .800 
.483  .596  .668  .441 
NL  .732  .633  .782 
.764  .779  .215 
8  .551  .512 
~  .185  .385 
UK  .723 
.153 
us 
Long-ter•  interest  rates  (3) 
~  .oa1  .779  •  101  .451  .312  .700  .154  .614  .214 
•  .137  .903  •  976  .366  .  .166  .950  .969  .765  .931 
DIC  .481  .433  .149  .271  .289  .213  .123  .365  - .651  .144  .213  .669  .770  .116  .739  .612 
•  - .623  .476  .111  .147  .745  .s11  .319 
.117  .472  .677  .901  .aoa  .651  .125  ,  .507  .701  .511  .204  .502  .165  - .3q$  .181  .914  .972  .693  ·.912 
111.  .541  .230  .370  .891  ••  10  - .003  .251  .221  .619  .274 
1  .112  .251  .451  .171'  - .124  .925  .490  .905 
NL  .733  .331  .207  - .194  .640  .914 
8  .453  .039  - .615  .925 
UIC  - .345 
.639 
us·  • 
• 
(1)  Co,relations were  calcwlate<f  on  the basis of •o'rithlyaverage r.a.t.n,  for  ~ .anth ~intl'r-bank 
•oney  exce11t  for Italy and  the United  St'ates  (3  11onth 'Treasury bills>, 11elgiU.  (yield of 
4 •onth certificates of  the  Fonds  des  Rentes)  and  Den.ark  (day  to day  rates of  the •oney 
111rkeU. 
(2)  National  interest  rates weighted  according to their average  effective weight  in the  ECU 
in 1979  · 
(3)  Correlations were  calculated on  the basis  of~n~tyaverage rates of  the  yield of  long-
ter• bonds  of  the publi·c  sector~ 18.-
low  level.  Some  other,  less  dramatic  increases  in  interest  rate correlations 
call  for  a  different  interpretation,  for  example  the stronger  correlation of 
the  smaller  former  'Snake'  currencies'  rates on  the  DM,  and  the moderate 
increase  in  the  correlation of  United  Kingdom  rates  on  those of  the  Community 
average  and  DM.  These  weaker,  more  generalised  increases  in  correlation 
would  seem  to  reflect  common  influences originating outside the  EMS,  for 
example  the  need  to  respond  to  the  new  inflationary  influence of  the  second 
oil  shock.  On  the other  hand,  the collective decision  to  face  this  external 
shock  with  a  concerted policy  respon~e was  very  much  a  matter of 
operational  concern  for  the  EMS.  The  EMS  commitment  having  been  established, 
the arrival  of  unexpectedly difficult circumstances  in  the  shape  of  the  second 
oil  shock  demanded  of  its participants a  higher  degree  of policy  convergence 
than  in  the  preceding  few  years.  Indeed,  one  could  speculate whether  the 
founders  of  the  EMS  might  have  had  second  thoughts  on  when  to  launch  the 
venture,  had  they  been  armed  with  perfect  foresight  on  the price of oil. 
However,  that  is  now  an  academic  matter,  and  in  fact  the policy  response  has 
been  much  more  convergent  and  Less  accomodating.  In  the after-math  of 
the first oil  shock  philosophies  diverged  fundamentally  between  on  the 
one  hand  those  who  considered  that  the  inflation  impact  was  inevitable and 
that  the .demand  impact  should  be  compensated  by  fiscal  policy,  and  on  the other 
hand  those  who  took  a  Less  accomodating  view. 
Movements  in  Long-term  rates  have  also  become  more  strongly correlated, 
but  here  the greater  intra-European  convergence  of  movements  has  also  been 
matched  by  closer  transatlantic movements  between  European  and  United  States 
rates.  This  would  seem  Likely  to  reflect  further,  durable features  of  the  economic 
scene,  such  as  the  rise  in  public  sector deficits and  the  renewed  acceleration 
of  inflation. 
Real  interest  rate differentials are fairly  hazardous  to  compare, 
because  of  the  uncertainty as  to  what  period's  inflation rate to  use  to deflate 
nominal  rates;  moreover,  differences  in  tax  treatment are also  important  but 
difficult  to  summarise  simply.  In  spring  1981,  high  real  interest  rates  were 
practised by  Germany,:  Belgium,  Netherlands  and  Denmark,  reflecting  strong 
defensive  efforts  to  keep  up  the  exchange  rate and  finance  Large  balance of 
payments  deficits.An extreme  case was  Belgium,  with  over  7%  real  Long-term interest 
rates,  helping  finance  particularly  Large  balance of payments  and  public  sector 
deficits.  Denmark's  Long-term  interest  rates appeared  to  be  highest  in  real 
terms,  but  this  reflects  income  tax provisions  which  make  for  very  much  lower 
real  after-tax  rates  in  addition  to  balance of  payments  and  public  sector 
financing  needs. 19.-
In  the  Irish and  Italian cases  the  high  rate of  inflation  is  largely  responsible 
for  the  negative  real  long-term  rates:  h1gh  nominal  rates  have  dis-
incentive effects on  economic  development  even  when  the  real  rates  appear  to 
be  low  or  negative.  The  United  Kingdom  and  French  real  long-term  rates  were 
in  early 1981  at  the  relatively  'normal'  levels ofaround 2%,although  the 
United  Kingdom  case  is  difficult  to  judge  because of  the  rapidly  changing 
inflation  rate. 
Illustrating the  power  of  interest  rate policy on  exchange  rates 
was  the action of  the  Bundesbank  in  February  1981,  when  it decided  that 
powerful  action  had  to  be  taken  to  raise  the  OM's  exchange  rate  from  a 
position of  weakness  in  the  EMS  and  against  the dollar.  By  various 
measures  to  limit  the access  of  banks  to  central  bank  credit,  short  term  rates 
were  raised within  two  weeks  by  five points  from  9  1/2%  to 14  1/2% 
(thus  raising  real,  short-term  rates  in  Germany  to  the exceptionally high 
level  of  some  10%).  With  this action alone,  and  indeed  long-term  rates  hardly 
increased at all, the  OM  was  lifted from  the  floor  almost  to  the  ceiling 
of  its  EMS  margins. 20.-
3.3  Balance of  payments 
One  of  the main  features  of  aft&r•math  of  the  second  oil  shock, 
compared  to  the first,  is that almost  all Communi.ty  Member  States  have 
found  themselves  in  heavy  current  account  deficit - the only  exception  being 
the  United  Kingdom  due  to  its oil  endowment.  Thus  Germany,  France,  Italy 
and  the  Netherlands  countries ·are all, i~ 1981,  expected  to have  deficits of the 
ofder of  1  to  2%  of  GOP,  while  for Denmark,  Belgium  and  Ireland  very  much 
larger deficits are  forecast  (3,6,  6,6 and  11,1%  of  GOP  respectively) .(See Table  ~~ 
While  the oil  price rise has  been  a  major  influence,  this  should not 
persuade  the  Europeans  (of  the  Community  and  other  European  OECD  countries 
which  are  in  similar situations)  to  ignore  the  disturbing  fact  that Japan 
and  the  United  States  have  for  their part  much  more  balanced positions. 
The  ECU 1s  substantial  depreciation against  the dollar and  yen  over  the 
twelve  months  to  March  1981"  (16%  and  19%  ~espectively)  shows  that  exchange 
markets  for  their part  have  noticed  this  weakening  in  relative world  trading 
performance  of  the  Community. 
As  regards  intra-European  exchange  rate movements,  it is fairly 
evident  how  current account  positions  have  been  a  major  influence  in  the 
recent  past,  especially  bearing  in mind  the thesis  that  exchange  rate markets 
are particularly  influenced  by  changes  in traditional  structural  current 
account  positions.  Thus  sterling's strength  witnesses  the  relatively good  balance 
of payments  position of  a  country  which  traditionally has  been  deficit prone. 
Conversely,  the  OM's  weakness  until  recently may  have  seemed  surprising 
against  a  background  of  a  current account  deficit of a  similar order  of 
magnitude  as  those of  France  and  Italy;  but  against  Germany's  traditional 
balance of  payments  strength  the  recent deficit experience has  been  relatively 
much  more  striking  than  that of  several  other  countries.  One  may  make 
analogous  remarks  on  the  Belgian and  Danish  situations.  Belgian's  new  deficit 
experience  (beginning  in 1977,  after a  decade  of uninterrupted  surpluses) 
seems  to  have  pushed  the  Belgian  francs  harder  downwards  than  Denmark's 
experience of  'more  of  the  same'  (20  deficits out  of the  last  twenty-one  years) 
has  affected  the  krone.  The  Irish pound's  med1um  strength  in  the  EMS  despite 
Ireland's  extremely  large payments  deficit seems  to  be  explained  in part  by 
its structural  familiarity  (twenty-one deficits out of  the  last  twenty-three 
years),  but  also  by  the  fact  that  Community  loans  are covering  a  substantial 21.-
fraction  of  the deficit  for  investment  project  financing,  and  by  the  fact 
that  the  upward  float  of  the British pound  has  meant  a  degree of  effective 
exchange  rate depreciation  for  the  Irish pound. 
Exchange  markets  are  influenced  by  perceptions of  how  medium-term 
factors  are  likely  to affect  the  evolution of  balance of payments  positions. 
The  most  notable and  precisely observable of  these at present  is  the  trend 
of  dependence  on  imported oil.  Interesting  data  has  recently  been  made 
available  in  the  formulation  of  Community  energy  policy objectives  for 
1985  and  1990.  Looking  first at  the  Community's  overall  performance,  the 
degree  of  energy  dependence  on  imported  oil  is  seen as  declining  quite  sub-
stantially by  18  percentage points  over  a  fifteen  year  period  from  55%  in 
1975  to  48%  in  1979;  and  37%  in 1990  (see Table 7). 
Over  the  fifteen  year  period,  the  countries making  most  progress are 
Denmark  (expecting  to  increase  its  indigenous  gas  and  oil  supplies)  with 
a  48  point  reduction  in  dependence  on  imported oil,  United  Kingdom  with  a 
39  point  reduction  (but  with  the period of  total  energy  independence  in 
the mid-1980s  not  lasting  to  1990>,  and  France  with  a  29  point  reduction 
(due  essentially to  its  very  ambitious  nuclear  programme).  By  comparison, 
Germany  and  Italy,  both  of  whose  nuclear  programmes  are subject  to  serious 
delays,  are  expected  to  achieve  much  smaller  reductions  in  dependence  on 
imported  oil  (11  and  14  points  respectively). 
Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  are also  seen  as  falling  behind  the 
average  energy  independence  position  in  the  Community.  The  Netherlands, 
with  Luxembourg,  are the only countries  whose  degree  of  energy  independence 
is  likely to  be  weaker  in  1990  than  in  1975.  In  the  Netherlands,  the  main 
explanation  is  the decline  in natural  gas  production,  insufficiently  com-
pensated  by  production  from  other  indigenous  supplies.  The  energy  position 
of  the  Benelux  countries  underlines  the  urgency  of  these countries•  needs 
to make  rapid  adjustments  in other  respects,  notably  to  restore their 
industrial  competitiveness  and  apply greater discipline  to  their public 
finances. 21a.-
Table  7:  De~endence of  the  Communit~  on  im~orted oil  1975-90  ' 1' 
percentages of 
total  energy 
1975  1979  1985  1990  change  from 
1975  to  1990 
OK  90,7  73,8  50,5  42,7  - 48 
D  50,6  50,8  43,3  39,5  - 11 
GR  79,3  60,9  56,1 
F  63,1  63,9  46,2  (34,0>  (- 29) 
IRL  79,3  73,9  69,0  65,1  - 14 
I  70,8  71,2  68,0  (56,4)  (- 14) 
NL  45,4  51,3  (51 ,4)  (52,1)  +  7 
B  57,4  56,7  (51,  4)  50,4  - 7 
L  34,2  34,4  40,7  36,2  +  2 
UK  43,2  8,5  (-7,2)  (4,2)  (- 39) 
EC  (55,0) '
2
'  48,1  (39,4)  (37, 2)  (- 18) (2) 
(1)  Net  imports  of oil  as  per  cent  of gross  inland  energy  consumption  plus  bunkers. 
(2)  9  Member  States. 
Source:  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  "Examination of  energy  policy 
objectives  for  1990  and  investment  programmes  of  Member  States", February 
1981.  Alternative projections  for  some  countries  were  made  for 
1985  and  1990  and  in  the  table  the median  point  in  the  range  is 
indicated  for  these  cases  (for  which  the  figures  are  in  brackets). 
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4.  Other  aspects  of  adjustment  and  convergence  needed  in·  the  European  economy 
Important  as monetary  stability, and  monetary  convergence  within  Europe, 
is for  the  Community's  sound  economic  development,  it is  not  a  sufficient or 
complete  approach  to our  problems  of  economic  maladjustment. 
Europe  is  suffering  some  decline  in world  wide  industrial  competitivity; 
the  rate of growth  of  economic  potential  has  slowed  at a  time  that  the 
demographic  expansion  of  the  work  force  has  speeded  up;  its  level  of wage 
incomes  and  social  benefits are among  the  highest  in  the world,  and  the 
momentum  in  the  growth  of  public  expenditure does  not  seem  to  have  been 
arrested with  the  onset  of  slower  growth.  The  very  fast  rise of  unemploy-
ment,  which  is  very  likely to  continue  to 1985,  poses  an  increasingly 
dramatic  challenge,  especially when  viewed  alongside another  growth  sector: 
that of  the  'black'  or  submerged  economy. 
What  is  specifically European  about  this situation? 
It is distinct  from  that of  the  United  States  which  made  very  large gains 
in  cost  competitiveness  over  the  last  decade  through  depreciation of  the 
dollar.  The  price of  real  assets and  of  labour  became  distinctly cheaper  than 
in  Europe,  at  least  by  comparison  with  the geographic  core of  the  European 
Community  (Germany,  Benelux,  France)  with  its  high  wage  and  social  security 
costs.  The  tide of  transatlantic direct  investment  flows  which  Servan-Schreiber 
wrote  of  a  decade  ago  as  the "defi  americain"  has  turned.  This  may  have 
solved one  problem,  that of preventing  Europe  from  being  bought  up  by  America, 
but  at  the  expense  of  seeing  another  emerge  in  its place - that  of  insufficient 
competitivity.  The  United  States on  the other  hand,  share with  Europe  the 
problems  of managing  the problems  of decline of certain old  industries -
especially steel  - and  of old city centres.  But  already  here  some  of  the  solutions 
will  have  to differ:  for  example,  Europe  with  its linguistic frontiers, 
high  population density and  regional affinities,  cannot  contemplate  a  pattern 
of  economic  redevelopment  similar to  that  seen  in  the  United  States  in  the  ex-
pansion of  the  sun-belt  states and  the writing off of  old urban  communities. 
Enlargement  of  the  Community  to  the  south  may  open  up  an  image  of a  certain 
European  sun-belt  development  in  due  course,  maybe  towards  the  end  of  the 
century,  but  not  tomorrow. 23.-
The  European  situation  is different  too  of  course to  that  of  Japan 
whose  super-competitivity  in  industry,  and  increasingly  in  its  new,  high-
technology  branches  - alongside  the  super-competitivity of  some  newly 
industrialising countries  in more  basic  branches  - is  the mirror  image  of 
the  European  problem. 
What  remedies  should  Europe  consider?  The  simplest  to  suggest 
would  be  an  exchange  rate depreciation of  the  ECU  against  the dollar and 
the  yen.  Already  a  large adjustment  took  place over  the  last  year,  albeit 
from  end-1979  levels  which  were  extremely  low  for  the dollar and  yen.  With 
the  EMS  now  having  provided more  organised  intra-European monetary  relations, 
it is both  natural  and  possible for  Europe  to  think  in  terms  of  a  more 
deliberate exchange  rate policy  in  relation to  third countries.  (Other 
contributions  to  the  conference  will  elaborate on  this).  On  the  economic 
implications of  this option,  as  in all  currency depreciations,  the  hypo-
thetical  case  of  Europe  depreciating against  third country  currencies 
entails  a  measure  of  new  opportunity  for  increased export  sales and  employ-
ment,  and  a  measure  of  cost  in  terms  of  aggravating  inflation and  a  worsening 
in  terms·of  trade,  especially from  a  dollar-denominated price of oil. 
Some  calculations  from  the  Commission's  COMET  econometric  model  suggest  that 
a  10%  depreciation of  the  ECU  might  have  the  following  effects  for  the 
Community  as  a  whole,  compared  to  what  otherwise might  have  been  the  case. 
Four  years after  the depreciation,  the effects would  have  accumulated  to 
a  1/4%  higher  output  level,  2%  higher  consumer  prices,  1/4%  higher  employ-
ment  and  S 2  1/2  billion better balance of payments  current account.  While 
these output  and  employment  effects are  not  trivial, the  impact  on  unemploy-
ment  remains  very  small  in  relation  to  its present  total  level  of 7  1/2%. 
More  fundamentally,  these orders of magnitude  suggest  the  remaining  presence 
of  structural  economic  problems  going  deeper  into the  economy  than  can  be 
handled  by  an  exchange  rate change  alone. 24.-
economic  problems  going  deeper  into  the  economy  than  can  be  handled  by  an 
exchange  rate change  alone. 
A second  set of  remedies  might  start from  the view  that  Europe's 
private economy  has  become  sluggish  in  performance  because  it  is encumbered 
by  the  excessive  claims  of  an  escalating  public  sector and  social  security 
and  regulation  system  on  the one  hand,  and  by  excessive and  rigidly structured 
pay  claims  on  the other;  hence  a  low  investment  ratio,  and  an  increasing 
share of  the  smaller  total  on  rationalising  rather  than  expansion-oriented 
investment.  To  be  sure,  there are  considerable differences  between  the 
Community  Member  States  on  these  scores,  and  the German  and  French  economies 
have  avoided  the most  damaging  excesses  seen  elsewhere  as  regards  an 
unchecked  growth  of  public  expenditure taxation and/or  public defjcits 
(1) 
(viz.  Belgium,  Netherlands,  Denmark  and  Ireland)  or  in a  debilitating militancy 
and  disorganisation  in  trade union  bargaining  performance  (viz.  Italy and 
the  United  Kingdom),  or  various particular mixes  of  these  economic  and 
political ailments.  Notwithstanding  the diversity within  Europe,  I  would 
suggest  that  these  ailments are serious and  extensive  enough  to  make  a  deeper 
remedy  than  mere  exchange  rate adjustment,necessary. 
These  issues  may  be  illustrated with  a  number  of  examples  relating  to 
sectoral,  incomes,  employment  and  budgetary  policies where  the  European  dimension 
influences  the  adjustment  process. 
The  interaction of  Community  and  national  policy-making  can  be 
seen  most  clearly at present  in  trade and  industrial policies affecting 
particular sectors.  Thus  in  the  steel  industry,  to  take  the most 
dramatic  example,  Member  States and  the  Comm~nity have  been  deciding 
together  on  the  degree  and  duration of  restraint on  internal  and 
~xternal trade  to  be  accepted as  a  component  of  a  strategy for  reducing 
redundant  capacity and  redeploying  labour  into  new  industrieso  The 
Community  dimension  further  extends  into  rules  for  limiting  the  subsidis-
ation of  operating  losses,  and  into  the provision of  subsidies and  loans 
for  inciting  new  industries to move  into  the old steel  regions and  for 
retraining  the  ex-steel  workers.  Although  the  Commission's  formal  powers 
of  intervention are particular  in  the steel sector,  the  same  basic  issues 
arise across  a  range  o~  major  old  industries  (ship-building,  textiles etc.>. 
The  rules of trade,  competition,  and  official  financial  intervention need 
to  be  set  together  and  having  done  this  together  in  the  Community,  part of 
the  framework  of  a  much  wider  set of policies  has  been  conditioned. 
(1)  See  Table  8  below. 25.-
On  incomes,  I  have  already  discussed  the  inflation aspect  above 
in  the  context  of  the stability of  the  EMS.  Unfortunately,  the  problems 
run  deeper  than  the objective of  securing  Low  nominal  wage  increases  to 
achieve  a  Low  rate of  price  inflation.  The  Belgian  case,  in  which  the 
high  unemployment  now  substantially exceeds  the  Low  inflation  rate  (1G% 
to  6%  respectively)  is an  example.  Several  types  of  evidence  suggest  that 
renewed  attention  be  given also  to  the  Level  of  real  wages  in  relation 
to  the  return on  capital,  on  the  fixing  of  wage  relativities between  skills 
on  the  Level  of  real  wages  in  relation to  those  in  competing  economies. 
The  circumstantial  evidence  includes  the  high  Level  of  unemployment  going 
together  with  the  apparent  exhaustion of  Keynesian  demand  expansion  as  an 
efficient antidote,  the  rapid growth  of  the  'black'  or  'submerged'  economy, 
and  the  increasing  tendency  for  the  weaker  investment  performance  to  be 
itself devoted  more  to  rationalisation  rather  than  expansion  (rationalis-
ation,  as  reported  by  business  surveys,  Largely  meaning  Labour  saving 
technology).  If this  diagnosis  is  correct,  the antidote will  have  to  be 
sought  accordingly  in  a  more  flexible adjustment  of  wages  to  (a)  the  needs 
for  higher  corporate profitability  (b)  the  needs  for  more  flexibility 
in  setting  income  differentials according  to skills, and  work  experience, 
in addition  to  (c)  the  need  for  wage  moderation  to  reduce  inflation.  The 
difficulties of  a  policy of  this  type  would  be  acute  in  the early years 
when  personal  incomes  would  have  to  be  depressed  in  real  terms,  until  the 
positive  employment  response  builds  up,  and  so  creates a  renewed  expansion 
of private  consumption  demand  together  with  expansion-oriented  investment. 
Other  difficulties  for  the  trade  unions  would  be  in  a  Lesser  uniformity 
in wage  settlements,  allowing  wage  differentials to  move  towards  market-
clearing  Levels.  Some  governments  have  tried subsidy  measures  aimed  at  bring-
ing  real  wage  costs  for  some  categories more  into  Line  with  economic  realities, 26.-
ranging  from  permanent  regional  wage  subsidies  Ca  decade  ago  in the  United  King-
dom,  now  abolished),  to  'temporary'  empldyment  subsfdies  for  averting  dismissals 
from  companies  or  sectors  in  di~ficulty. The  problem  with  such  measures  are 
ones  of  scale,  cost  and  effectiveness.  If the problem  of  unemployment  is a 
massive  one,  the  wage  subsidies must  either aim  at a  redistribution of 
unemployment  more  evenly  across  the  population  which  may  be  useful  but 
does  not  resolve  the· overall  problem,  or  become  extremely  expensive.  Over 
time  there  is~s~epe f0r  wage  bargainers  to  absorb  the benefit of  the  subsidy 
by  adjusting  upwards  pay  rates  for  the groups  concerned.  This  then  becomes 
symptomatic  of  t~e original  problem  of  wage  negotiation practises  having 
failed  to  come  to  terms  with  economic  realities at  the  enterprise or 
macroeconomic  Level. 
This  issue  is typically one  that  needs  analysis,  debate and  under-
standing  at  a  European  level,  because  it affects  the overall  mix  of policies 
(monetary,  exchange  rate,  budgetary,  incomes)  to  be  prescribed  in  response 
to  stagflation and  unemployment.  However,  the  adjus~ment in  behaviour  over 
pay  essentially calls  for  more  decentralised,  varied and  market-oriented 
solutions. 
The  same  is  true  for  another  prescription now  commonly  advocated  to 
relieve  unemployment  problems:  the adjustment  of working  time.  There  is 
no  doubt  that there  is  here  a  collection of  techniques  (the  length  of  the 
working  week,  extent of  overtime,  length  of  holidays,  flexible or earlier 
retirement,  extension of part-time work,  leave of absence  from  professional 
work)  which  could  potentially have  a  very  large  impact  on  both  the  sharing 
of  work  more  or  Less  evenly  between  the  population,  and  on  the  competitive 
capacity  to  provide  employment  in  conditions of  stability.  In  any  discussion 
of  work-sharing  issues  three principal  conditions  for  a  successful  distribution 
of  work  between  more  employees  and  Less  unemployed  have  to  be  faced  • 
(i)  Do  the  employees  accept  that  hourly  Labour  costs should not  increase more 
than  the  resultant  productivity gain?  Cii). Is manpower  with  the  right skills 
available at  the  time  and  place  required  to make  up  the  shorter working 
time  of others?  (iii).Can work  organisation be  so  arranged  to avoid an 
increase  in  capital  costs  (e.g.  can  shift-work  be  adapted  to  prevent  equip-
ment  and  other overhead  facilities  being  used  less  intensively?). 
These  conditions are demanding,  but  none  Less  than  common  sense;  especially 
if it  is  recognised  that  the  European  economy  faces  problems  of weak 27.-
competitivity and  inflexibility to  the  needs  of adjustment  to  economic 
efficiency.  The  issue of work-sharing  practices  has  been  put  at  the 
European  Level  by  the  European  Trade  Union  Confederation.  It  is again 
a  paradoxical  subject  in  terms  of  the  level  of  bargaining  unit at  which 
it should  be  handled.  The  principles  need  to  be  debated  and  established at 
the  European  level,  because of the  scope  for  seriously affecting  competitivity 
if divergent  approaches  are  followed.  On  the other  hand,  the  conditions 
for  a  successful  adjustment  of  working-time  have  to  be  worked  out at 
the  decentralised  level  of  the  individual  shop,  office and  factory, 
subject  to  certain framework  provisions at a  national  Level 
Con  pensions,  the  standard working  week,  etc.), themselves  decided  with  a 
clear  view  of  competitivity  considerations. 
On  public  finance  there are  needs  for  adjustment  of  several  types, 
ranging  from  some  problems  common  to  virtually all  Member  States to  a 
number  of  seriously  imbalanced  situations.  The  first general  problem  is 
that  the  upward  rise of  public  expenditure as  a  share of Gross  Domestic 
Product  does  not  yet  seem  to  have  been  halted.  The  share  rose  from  32% 
in  1960  to  38%  in  1970  and  to  47%  in 1980.  There  is  no  doubt  about  the 
genuineness  of  the  social  wants  represented  by  these  trends,  with  public 
health,  income  security and  redistribution being  the  heaviest  and  fastest-
growing  classes of  expenditure.  The  problem,  of  course,  is  to  judge  how 
fast  or  fully  the satisfaction of  these wants  can  be  financed  by  the 
public  sector  without  undermining  the growth  ~f productive potential  of 
the  economy,  and  thus  the capacity  to  pay  for  social  services and  objectives 
in  non-inflationary ways.  A related problem  is  how  far  these  trends  can 
go  before  inducing  two  serious  Labour  market  ailments  that  weaken  economic 
potential.  The  first of  these  is an  increase  in  the  volume  of  voluntary 
unemployment  or  withdrawal  from  the  labour  force  where  social  security 
incomes  have  become  a  substantial  or  high  fraction of  the post-tax 
income  of  the available wage  income.  The  second  is  the  inducement  to  work 
in  the  'black'  economy  in  ways  that  escape  social  security contributions and 
taxation,  which  often means  work  of  a  very  Low  level  of  productivity. 
This  malady  is particularly grave  in  the  extreme  case,  which  reportedly 
exists  in  Italy  in more  than  trivial  numbers,  whereby  government  employees 
obtain  social  security  coverage  from  their official  employment,  while  combining 
abstenteeism  and  spare  time  to  take also  'submerged'  employment. 27a.-
Table  8:  Public  finance  aggregates  in 1980,  percentages of  GOP 
General  government 
Expenditure  Receipts  N  b 
.  (1)  et  orrow1ng 
Germany  46,4  43,3  - 3,0 
France  46,5  45,6  - 0,9 
Italy  46,0  37,4  - 8,5 
United  Kingdom  43,9  41,2  - 2,8 
Belgium  53,4  45,2  - 8,2 
Denmark  56,2  52,7  - 3,5 
Ireland  55,1  42,3  -12,8 
Netherlands  59,3  57,0  - 2,3 
EC  47,3  43,8  - 3,9 
Central  government 
net  borrowing 
.  ( 2)  requ1rement 
- 3,3 
- 1,1 
-11,1 
- 3,6 
- 6,9 
- 6,1 
-13,6 
- 3,9 
- 4,3 
(1)  National  accounts,  transactions basis,  excluding  loans  and  participations 
(2)  Budget  accounts,  including  Loans  and  participations 
Source:  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  "Annual  Economic  Review  1980-81", 
Table 4.2,  European  Economy  N°  7,  November  1980. 28.-
The  small  Member  States  (Denmark,  Belgium,  Netherlands,  Ireland)  now 
stand out  for  the  extremely  high  Levels  to  which  they  have  carried public 
expenditure  Call  in  the  range  of  53  to  59%  of  GOP),  and  various manifest-
ations of  how  this  has  affected  the  Labour  market  are evident  enough:  in 
Belgium,  married  women  have  until  recently  been  entitled to  unemployment 
benefits  without  time  Limit  and  without  income  constraints  based  on  family 
income;  inthe Netherlands,  the percentage of persons  registered and  compen-
sated as  being  handicapped  has  risen  to an  extraordinarily high  fraction 
compared  to other  countries  (this  has  happened  too  in  Italy);  in  Denmark, 
there are  sizeable group  of  unemployed  persons  complaining  about  problems 
of dispatch  of  their benefits  to  Majorca.  The  adverse  employment  effects 
of  exceptional  Largesse  in public  finance  policies are probably only  to  a 
small  degree  reflected  in  various  unemployment  anomalies  Like  those  quoted, 
compared  to  the macroeconomically  more  significant effects  coming  through 
with  very  high  taxation  and  interest  rates. 
Italy,  Ireland and  Belgium  stand out  for  the exceptionally  high 
Levels  of  their public  sector deficits,  now  approaching  10%  of  GOP  or  more. 
The  deficits  have  grown  for  a  combination  of  reasons:  commitment  to  invest-
ment  and  employment  oriented policies  (Italy and  Ireland)  and  difficulties 
in maintaining  govermental  majorities  (Belgium,  Italy)  able  to  take  restric-
tive measures  to  counter  the automatic  tendencies  of  current  public  expen-
diture to  grow  very  fast.  It now  seems  beyond  any  reasonable doubt  that 
the  sustainable,  employment-boosting  potential  of public  finance  policy 
at  this  Level  of deficits  is  reduced  to  zero or  even  Less.  The  disincen-
tive effects of  very  high  real  interest  rates  for  private  investment  are 
undoubtedly  very  serious  in  Belgium.  In  the  cases  of  Italy and  Ireland 
where  inflation and  the  nominal  rates are  high  but  the  real  rates are  Low, 
interest  rate payments  in  the  budget  have  come  to  represent  a  Large  share 
of  the  total  public  sector deficit;  since  these payments  Largely  represent 
compensation  to  bond  holders  for  the  erosion of  the  real  value of their 
bonds,  they  may  more  correctly be  interpreted - economically  - as  advance 
repayments  of  capital  by  the public  sector.  Thus  the  real  stimulatory 
value  for  the  economy  of  these  rising deficits  is  highly  questionablea 29.-
The  case of  the  United  Kingdom  at  present  stands  on  its own,  by 
contrast,  as  the most  strenuous  example  of  an  adjustment  policy  combining 
severe  public  finance  policies  with  a  very  high  exchange  rate which  thus 
forces  exceptionally  hard  adjustments  on  the private sector  exposed  to 
international  competition.  The  particular  combination of policies  is made 
feasible  by  the  favourable  impact  of  the oil  sector on  the balance of  pay-
ments.  The  policy accepts  the  transitional  costs of adjustment.  In  the 
course of  so  doing,  we  Learned  recently,  for  example,  that  the productivity 
of  the  Welsh  steel  sector  has  been  doubled  in  the  course of  the year.  While 
this  example  is  hardly  typical  of  the  economy  as  a  whole,  it is a  reminder 
of  the  scale of  an  effort  which  might  in a  few  years  raise British  indus-
trial productivity an  enormous  step  up  to  the  Level  of  the  European  average 
- where  it has  every  reason  to  be  in any  case. 
Conclusions 
I  summarise  by  trying to  answer  three questions. 
(i)  Who  is  trying  to adjust  in  relation to  whom  in  Europe?  Who  should 
be  adjusting  on  whom?  The  adjustment  standard within  the  Community  seems 
to  be  a  mixture of  on  the one  hand  the  Community  average and  on  the other 
hand  Germany.  A country  with  a  Community  average  performance  in  terms  of 
inflation,  the  balance  of  payments  and  interest  rates  can  expect  to  Lie 
relatively  comfortably  in  the mjddle  of  its  EMS  margins,  and  various  mech-
anisms  give  some  normative  status  to  the  average,  for  example  the  functions 
of  the  ECU  as  numeraire  for  EMS  parities and  in  the  divergence  indicator. 
But  the  German  model  has  the great merits  of  representing  the best  perfor-
mance  for  stabilisation,  employment  and  Living  standards.  Germany's 
economic  policy  philosophy  has  gained adherents  in  recent  years  such  that 
it  is  now  regarded  widely as  a  balanced mixture of_monetarism,  supply  side 
and  demand  policy,  coupled  to an  active but  non-interventionist pursuit of 
social  consensus  over  income  bargaining.  As  regards  the wider  world,  the 
Community  has  to adjust  in  relation  to  the  competitive strengths of  the 
United  States,  Japan  and  the  newly  industrialised countries,  and  certainly 
to  strengthen  its  global  performance.  However,  each  of  these  three groups 
seems  to offer only partial  and  in  several  senses  more  distant models  for 
the  Community  to  relate to. 30.-
(ii)  Is  Europe  succeeding  in  its processes of adjustment  and  coordination? 
As  regards  its most  concrete objective of  nominal  exchange  rate stability 
and  the  techniques  of  central  banking  policy to  assure  this  (through  interest 
rate management  and  market  intervention),  the answer  is so  far  yes,  although 
there  is  ample  scope  for  more  developed  techniques  of  coordination  here.  The  same 
is  true of  the management  of  central  rate  realignments.  As  regards  balance of 
payments  performance,  the major  countries are  in  relatively compatible  situations. 
But  some  of  the  smaller  countries  need  to adjust  harder  and  faster;  this  is 
also  true,  in  milder  degree,  of  the whole  Community  vis-a-vis  the  rest of  the 
world.  As  regards  energy ·adjustment,  substantial  progress  is  under  way,  taking 
a  ten-year  view,  but  there are  some  Laggards.  As  regards  basic  perceptions 
of what  mix  of  monetary,  budgetary  and  structural policies are  now  called for, the 
situation has  been  far  more  convergent  than after the first oil  shock.  A multi-
policy  philosophy  predominates  along  the  Lines  of the German  model,with  the 
extreme  propositions  of  single-policy predominance  (monetarist or  Keynesian) 
having  now  relatively  few  adherents.  However,  the gap  between  policy attitudes 
and  policy  performance  is  wider,  and  some  countries  need  now  to adjust  budgetary 
policies and  rigidities  in pay  bargaining  practices  (indexation etc.)  harder and 
faster  if  reality  is  to  keep  touch  with  objectives.  Given  that  the  EMS  virtually 
imposes  a  convergent  set of monetary  policies,  failures  to  control  budgetary 
policy as  firmly  has  Led  to  some  badly  distorted policy situations, with 
inflated budget  deficits  representing  neither an  effective demand  management 
policy  nor  a  productive  investment  for  national  savings. 
(iii)  Should  the  Community's  coordination system  work  around  a  more  elaborate 
set of  negotiated,  quantified targets  for  policy variables  (money  supply,  public 
finance)  or  the final  objectives of policy  (stabilisation, output,  employment)~ 
In  terms  of  hard,  collective commitments,  the  exchange  rate  is  probably  enough. 
Several  Member  States also  set objectives  for  money  supply,  but  there  has  to  be 
an  element  of  compromise  for  money  supply and  exchange  rate objectives  to 
live together:  in  Germany  this  is assured  to  the  extent  the  DM  tends  to  carry 
the  EMS  with  it  in  floating  against  the dollar.  Moreover,  the Bundesbank  thus 
sets  the main  point  of  reference  for  monetary  policy  in  Europe.  But  otherwise 
there are  too  many  determinants  of  exchange  rates,  and  too  many  unknowns  in 
the  course of  the  economy  to  make  it a  plausible proposition  to  seek  to  bind 
national  economic  policy  into multiple  fixed  commitments  at  a  Community  level, 
for  example  for  the  budget  deficit.  Moreover  the  track  record of governments  in 
setting  growth,  price and  unemployment  targets  for  multi-year periods  has 31.-
become  so  p~or as  to  have  made  this  too  an  unattractive proposition for 
the  time  being.  On  the other  hand  the  Community  continuesto  forecast  or 
project all  these  variables  for  the purpose of monitoring  policy, 
and  discussing options.  Governments  need  too  to make  medium-term  public 
finance  plans,  but  their  implementation  has  to  remain  a  national 
responsibility alongside  the  legislative powers  concerned.  There  should 
be  continuing  scope  for  episodic  bursts of  hard  coordination  to produce 
better  solutions  to  specific  problems;  I  would  stress  'episodic'  because 
of  the  need  to avoid overstretching  the very  concept  of  coordination, 
or  confusing  it with  a  transfer of  powers~ Policy  responsibilities  should 
be  kept  close  to  the  instruments  of action.  Power-sharing  is not  easy 
to arrange efficiently.  The  Community  can  and  does  help  set  several  of  the 
major  rules of  the game  (trade,  competition,  exchange  rates)  but  Member 
States  then  have  to  work  out  their own  political and  economic  preferences 
within  these  constraints.  Thus  soft  coordination  remains  a  basic  part  of 
the present  European  constitution;  hard  coordination will  tend to  be 
specialised by  policy domain  or  episodic;  Community  action  is  infiltrating 
into  several  policy  functions  (monetary;structural).  This  process at  times 
reaches  road-blocks  which  can  only be  surpassed  by  major  political  decisions 
on  Community  mechanisms  (the  EMS  was  the most  recent,  and  an  EMF  could  be 
the  next>,  but  there are also  recurrent opportunities  for  useful  Community 
action  that  can  be  reconciled with  the basic  constitution of powers, 
or at  least a  controlled shift  towards  a  more  substantial  European  dimension. 